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Abstract
We extend a well known diﬀerential oligopoly game to encompass the possibil-
ity for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated
through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap
is set so as to ﬁx the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the result-
ing equilibrium investment in green R&D is indeed concave in the structure
of the industry. Our analysis appears to indicate that inverted-U-shaped
investment curves are generated by regulatory measures instead of being a
‘natural’ feature of ﬁrms’ decisions.
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1 Introduction
The departure point of the analysis illustrated in this paper lies at the in-
tersection between two diﬀerent debates, one being centered upon the rela-
tion between competition and innovation, whose most recent development is
known as the Schumpeterian growth theory initiated by Aghion and Howitt
(1998), the other belonging to environmental economics and focussing on
the optimal design of policy instruments, such as environmental standards,
pollution rights and Pigouvian taxation, to stimulate ﬁrms’ investments in
abatement and/or replacement technologies (for an updated survey, see Lam-
bertini, 2013).
The acquired industrial organization approach to the bearings of market
power on the size and pace of technical progress can be traced back to the
indirect debate between Schumpeter (1934, 1942) and Arrow (1962) on the
so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis, which, in a nutshell, says that one should
expect to see an inverse relationship between innovation and market power
or market structure. Irrespective of the nature of innovation (either for cost
reductions or for the introduction of new products), a large theoretical lit-
erature attains either Schumpeterian or Arrovian conclusion (for exhaustive
accounts, see Tirole, 1988; and Reinganum, 1989).1 That is, partial equilib-
rium theoretical IO models systematically predict a monotone relationship,
in either direction.
The picture drastically changes as soon as one takes instead the stand-
point of modern growth theory. In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) stress
1See also Gilbert (2006), Vives (2008) and Schmutzler (2010) for add-on’s on this
discussion, where still the Schumpeter vs Arrow argument is unresolved.
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that empirical evidence shows a non-monotone relationship between industry
concentration (or, the intensity of market competition) and aggregate R&D
eﬀorts: this takes the form of an inverted-U curve, at odds with all exist-
ing theoretical IO models; in the same paper, the authors provide a model
yielding indeed such a concave result, and ﬁtting the data. A thorough dis-
cussion, accompanied by an exhaustive review of the related lively debate,
can be found in Aghion et al. (2013).
One could say that the inverted-U emerging from data says that Arrow is
right for small numbers, while Schumpeter is right thereafter. Alternatively,
on the same basis one could also say that neither Arrow nor Schumpeter can
match reality, if our interpretation of their respective views is that “competi-
tion (resp., monopoly) outperforms monopoly (resp., competition) along the
R&D dimension”. Be that as it may, there arises the need of constructing
models delivering a non-monotone relationship between some form of R&D
(for process, product or environmental-friendly innovations) and the number
of ﬁrms in the industry.
With this purpose in mind, here we extend a noncooperative diﬀeren-
tial game model dating back to Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978) and
Feichtinger (1983) to describe an industry in which ﬁrms sell a homogeneous
good and accumulate capacity over time through costly investments; ﬁrms’
activities entail polluting emissions hindering welfare, and the government
adopts a Pigouvian taxation policy aimed at providing them with an incent-
ive to internalise the environmental externality and therefore undertake R&D
projects for pollution abatement. As in the original model, the mark-up is
exogenously ﬁxed, and here is though of as an additional regulatory tool in
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the hands of the public authority.
Our main results can be outlined as follows. First, we show that there
exists a unique open-loop equilibrium which is subgame perfect and saddle-
point stable, for any pair of policy instruments. Then, taking again the
mark-up and tax rate as given, we prove that the aggregate green R&D
eﬀort is monotonically increasing in the number of ﬁrms, which is a deﬁnitely
Arrovian result. Subsequently, we endogenise the regulatory toolkit, allowing
ﬁrst the policy-maker to set that Pigouvian tax rate so as to maximise steady
state social welfare; in such a case, the aggregate R&D eﬀort is strictly convex
in the number of ﬁrms. If optimal taxation is accompanied by a mark-up
tailored on industry structure so as to limit the overall volume of emissions,
then there emerges a general condition on the shape of the price regulation
scheme whereby the industry investment is indeed concave w.r.t. the number
of ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The setup is laid
out in section 2, while the equilibrium analysis is in section 3. Section 4
illustrate the design of policy tools and its consequences on aggregate R&D
eﬀorts. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 The game
As anticipated in the introduction, here we extend the model introduced by
Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978) and further investigated by Feichtinger
(1983), to allow for the presence of an environmental externality and green
R&D investments. In the remainder, we will label this framework as the ‘LSF
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model’ for brevity. The market exists over t ∈ [0,∞) , and, as in Dragone et
al. (2010), it is served by N ≥ 1 a priori symmetric ﬁrms with individual
capacity xi (t) ≥ 0.
2 Given a ﬁxed proﬁt margin p ≥ 0, the instantaneous
proﬁt of ﬁrm i is
πi(t) = pxi (t)−
u2i (t)
2
− γki(t)−
k2i (t)
2
− τsi, (1)
where γ > 0 is a parameter. Capacity xi(t) changes according to
x˙i(t) = ui(t)− δxi(t), (2)
where ui(t) is the investment of ﬁrm i at time t. si(t) and ki(t) denote the
ﬁrm’s polluting emissions and R&D eﬀort respectively, and τ is the tax rate.
The emissions of a ﬁrm follow the dynamics
s˙i(t) = xi(t)− zki − h

j =i
kj − ηsi(t) (3)
where z is a positive parameter; parameter h ∈ [0, z) measures the spillover
eﬀect received from rivals’ R&D activity.
The total instantaneous volume of emissions at the industry level is S(t) =N
i=1 si(t). Therefore the social welfare function at any time can be deﬁned
as
SW (t) =
N
i=1
πi (t) + CS (t)− S (t) + τ
N
i=1
si (t) . (4)
Each ﬁrm has two control variables, investment in capacity ui(t) and
investment in green R&D ki(t). The policy maker has two instruments, the
2In the original formulation of the model, xi (t) is ﬁrm i’s sales volume, and ui (t)
its advertising investment. However, one can think of these variables as representing,
respectively, installed capacity (with each ﬁrm selling at full capacity at any time) and the
instantaneous investment to increase it.
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Pigouvian tax rate τ (which may be usefully thought of as incorporating
the price of emission rights) and the regulated mark-up p. To avoid time
inconsistency issues, we consider the policy menu applied onto the steady
state only. The structure of the model identiﬁes a linear state game (it
wouldn’t be so if either the policy were function of the state or the demand
function were endogenously determined). Therefore, the open-loop solution
is subgame perfect, respecting the original LSF formulation.
3 Equilibrium analysis
Firm i’s (i = 1, . . . , N) current-value Hamiltonian (from now on we suppress
the time argument)3
Hi(s,x,k,u) = πi + λiix˙i +

j =i
λijx˙j + µiis˙i +

j =i
µij s˙j (5)
generates the following ﬁrst order conditions (inner solution) for ﬁrm i’s
(i = 1, . . . ,N) controls
∂Hi
∂ui
= λii − ui = 0 (6)
∂Hi
∂ki
= −γ − ki − zµii − h

j =i
µij = 0 (7)
3In this respect, a remark is in order: note that, in general, the objective functional πi
has to be multiplied by the general multiplier λ0 to allow for the abnormal case (see e.g.
Leitmann (1981)). However, in the current model that abnormal case can be ruled out as
can be readily shown.
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Thus we obtain the following optimal controls of ﬁrm i (i = 1, . . . , N)
u∗i = λii
k∗i = −γ − zµii − h

j =i
µij . (8)
Furthermore, each ﬁrm i obtains the following dynamic equations for the
costates (i, j = 1, . . . , N , i = j)
λ˙ii = (ρ+ δ)λii − p− µii −

j =i
µijv
λ˙ij = (ρ+ δ)λij −

j =i
µij
µ˙ii = (ρ+ η)µii + τ
µ˙ij = (ρ+ η)µij . (9)
In order to characterize the optimal long run solution of the system we
have to derive the equilibria of the above deﬁned system of diﬀerential equa-
tions (i.e. state and costate equations of all ﬁrms). In this model the equi-
librium is unique. For the adjoint variables we obtain (i, j = 1, . . . ,N , i = j)
λˆii =
1
ρ+ δ

p−
vτ
ρ+ η

λˆij = 0
µˆii =
−τ
ρ+ η
µˆij = 0 (10)
Inserting into (8) yields the following equilibrium controls (i = 1, . . . , N)
uˆ∗i =
1
ρ+ δ

p−
τ
ρ+ η

kˆ∗i =
zτ
ρ+ η
− γ (11)
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Using these expressions for the state equations we obtain (i = 1, . . . ,N)
xˆi =
1
δ(ρ+ δ)

p−
τ
ρ+ η

sˆi =
1
η
 1
δ(ρ+ δ)

p−
τ
ρ+ η

−
 zτ
ρ+ η
− γ

(z + h(n− 1))

. (12)
Since all ﬁrms are assumed to be a priori symmetric, we deﬁne the steady
state values as uˆ := uˆi, kˆ := kˆi, xˆ := xˆi and sˆ := sˆi. Due to the economic
meaning of the model, we have to assume that the controls and the states are
non-negative for all t ∈ [0,∞). The following Lemma provides assumptions
such that the non-negativity is fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The state and control variables of every player i (i = 1, . . . ,N)
are non-negative if the following assumptions on the parameters are fulﬁlled
p(ρ+ η) ≥ τ ≥
γ(ρ+ η)
z
(A1)
1
h
 1
δ(ρ+ δ)

p−
1τ
ρ+ η
 zτ
ρ+ η
− γ
−1
− z

+ 1 ≥ n (A2)
Condition (A1) guarantees non-negativity of the controls (see (11)). Non-
negativity of xˆi is implied by (A1) and that of sˆi by (A2). The analysis of
the Jacobian matrix of the system shows that
Proposition 2 The unique equilibrium (xˆ, sˆ, uˆ∗, kˆ∗) is a saddle point.
From the adjoint equations it is easy to show that µij(t) = λij(t) = 0. Due
to the structure of the system it is possible to derive an analytical expression
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of the stable path, i.e.
xi(t) = xˆ+ (xi0 − xˆ)e
−δt
si(t) = sˆ− (xi0 − xˆ)
1
η + δ
(e−δt − e−ηt) + (si0 − sˆ)e
−ηt
µii(t) = µˆii
λii(t) = λˆii (13)
Now we are able to deﬁne a suﬃcient assumption that the controls and the
states are positive for all t ∈ [0,∞).
Lemma 3 Let (A1) and (A2) hold. Then the following assumption is suﬃ-
cient to ensure that all controls and states be positive over the whole planning
horizon.
xi0 ≤ xˆ, si0 ≤ sˆ, δ ≤ η.
Proof: u∗i (t) > 0 and ki(t) > 0 are trivial by the signs of the adjoint variables;
xi(t) > 0 is implied by xi0 ≤ xˆ. According to δ ≤ η, the second term of the
expression for si(t) is always positive. The sum of the ﬁrst and the third
term of si(t) is positive because of si0 ≤ sˆ.
The foregoing analysis has a seemingly not-so-intriguing ancillary implic-
ation:
Corollary 4 Since K∗ = Nk∗ is everywhere increasing in N for all τ >
(η + ρ) γ/z, the behaviour of aggregate R&D is Arrovian for any given Pigouvian
policy allowing for a positive investment.
However, there is more to it, which can be shown to emerge as soon as
one admits the reasonable possibility for regulation to enter the picture along
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two dimensions: one is obviously τ , as is usually the case in environmental
economics, the other is p, which is a speciﬁc feature of the present model.
Here, the mark-up is ﬁxed, and this fact can be interpreted as a consequence
of a price cap imposed by a public authority. The research question we are
about to assess in the following section is the following: is the portfolio of
policy instruments {p, τ} going to modify the apparently monotone behaviour
of aggregate R&D eﬀorts K∗ outlined in Corollary 4? And, if so, in what
direction?
4 Environmental policy and aggregate invest-
ment
The bearings of p and τ on aggregate R&D incentives can be appreciated
by addressing the issue in the following terms. It is already known (see
Benchekroun and Long, 1998, 2002, inter alia) that there exists a level of
Pigouvian taxation driving the industry to the ﬁrst best which would be
obtained under social planning. Call this tax rate τSP (p,N). This tax rate
must maximise the steady state level of the social welfare function, deﬁned
as
SW ∗ (τ ) = Nπ∗ (τ ) + CS∗ (τ)−N (1− τ ) s∗ (τ ) (14)
where
CS∗ (τ) =
(a− p)Nx∗ (τ)
2
(15)
is consumer surplus, calculated postulating the existence of a linear and
decreasing market demand function p = a−Nx∗ in which a > 0 is consumers’
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reservation price; indeed, p is the price that would prevail if the mark-up were
unregulated. Moreover, (14) accounts for the additional fact that the revenue
produced by Pigouvian taxation, Nτs∗ (τ) , is redistributed to consumers as
a windfall.
Then, τSP (p,N) can be easily calculated by solving the necessary condi-
tion ∂SW ∗ (τ) /∂τ = 0, satisﬁed by the unique tax rate:4
τSP (p,N) =
(η + ρ)

p (δ − ρ) η − (δ + ρ) (aη − 2) + 2δ (δ + ρ)2 (z + h (N − 1)) z
	
2δη

1 + 2c (δ + ρ)2 z2
	 .
(16)
Now observe that
∂K∗


τSP (p,N)

∂N
= 0 in n = max {1, n} , (17)
n = 2δγη2 + 4cδ (δ + ρ)2 (γη + h− z) + p (ρ− δ) η + (δ + ρ) (aη − 2)
4hδ (δ + ρ)2 z
,
and
∂2K∗


τSP (p,N)

∂N2
=
2h (δ + ρ)2 z2
η

1 + (δ + ρ)2 z2
	 > 0, (18)
showing that, if n ≥ 2, then in correspondence of n the aggregate R&D
level K∗


τSP (p,N)

is indeed being minimised. Hence, in this scenario no
inverted-U may arise (at most, if n is admissible, a U-shaped curve obtains),
since:
Lemma 5 If p is given, the equilibrium aggregate R&D eﬀort is convex in
N .
4The second order condition is satisﬁed, as
∂2SW ∗ (τ)
∂τ2
= −
N

1 + (δ + ρ)2 z2

(δ + ρ)2 (η + ρ)2
< 0
always.
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On the basis of the above Lemma, it seems that Pigouvian taxation is
in itself insuﬃcient to deliver an inverted-U R&D curve: the opposite shape
does in fact appear if n ≥ 2 (if so, then for a limited number of ﬁrms the
Schumpeterian hypothesis is conﬁrmed, while for suﬃciently large number of
ﬁrms the Arrovian position prevails).
What if p is set by the government for some purpose? Suppose ﬁrst that a
public agency is in charge of regulating the mark-up of this industry having
in mind objectives such as the entry process or consumer surplus, and let
p = p (N) , so that the mark-up is a function of industry structure.
Now use τSP (p,N) to calculate
sign

∂2K∗
∂N2

= sign

4δh (δ + ρ)2 z + η (δ − ρ) [2p′ (N) + np′′ (N)]

(19)
where p′ (N) ≡ ∂p (N) /∂N and p′′ (N) ≡ ∂2p (N) /∂N 2. Condition (19)
implies:
Proposition 6 For all δ > ρ, 2p′ (N)+np′′ (N) < −4δh (δ + ρ)2 z/ [η (δ − ρ)]
yields an inverted-U R&D curve at the industry level. In absence of spillovers
(h = 0), a decreasing and at least quasi-concave price (i.e., p′ (N) < 0 and
p′′ (N) ≤ 0) suﬃces to ensure ∂2K∗/∂N 2 < 0.
For instance, one could think of a reasonable situation in which the mark-
up is a linear and decreasing function of the number of ﬁrms in the industry,
e.g., p (N) = α − βN, with α > βN and β > 0, which generates p′ (N) =
−β < 0 and p′′ (N) = 0. This, combined with h = 0 and any δ > ρ, makes
K∗ concave in N .
An alternative way of modelling the role of price regulation rests on con-
sidering that, in general, τSP (p,N) - although maximising steady state social
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welfare - does not ensure the minimization of the externality or the attain-
ment of any given cap S¯ targeted by the public agency in charge of the
environmental policy.
If indeed the government wants to reduce emissions to zero, it must set
the regulated price at the level solving Ns∗ = S¯, which is
pSP


S¯

=
2S¯δ2η2 (1 + ς2) +N [2 + 2δ (h (N − 1) + z) (2ς − δΦ)− aηΨ]
ηN [1− δz ((δ + 3ρ) z + h (N − 1) (ρ− δ) z)]
(20)
where ς ≡ (δ + ρ) z, and
Φ ≡ γη + [γη − h (N − 1)− z] ς2;
Ψ ≡ 1 + δς [h (N − 1) + z] .
(21)
This delivers
K∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

,N

, pSP


S¯

=

δη2 (δ − ρ) S¯ − η


az + γ + 2δγ (δ + ρ) z2

N+
2z (1 + zδ (δ + ρ) (z + h (N − 1)))N ] / (22)
η [1 + zδ (z (δ + 3ρ)− h (N − 1) (δ − ρ))] .
From (22), we see that if h = 0, then
K∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

,N

, pSP


S¯

h=0
=

S¯zδη2 (δ − ρ) + 2Nz


1 + δ (δ + ρ) z2

− (23)
Nη


az + γ


1 + 2z2δ (δ + ρ)
	
/

η


1 + δz2 (δ + 3ρ)
	
,
which is necessarily monotone in N . In particular:
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Proposition 7 In the special case in which technological spillovers are ab-
sent, take
S¯ > max

0,
N [η (az + γ (1 + 2z2δ (δ + ρ)))− 2z (1 + z2δ (δ + ρ))]
zδ (δ − ρ) η2

to ensure K∗ (·)|h=0 > 0. Then,
∂ K∗ (·)|h=0
∂N
=
2z (1 + z2δ (δ + ρ))− η (az + γ (1 + 2z2δ (δ + ρ)))
η (1 + z2δ (δ + 3ρ))
≷ 0
for all
η ≶ η ≡ 2z (1 + z2δ (δ + ρ))
az + γ (1 + 2z2δ (δ + ρ))
.
The above Proposition says that, if the individual ﬁrm’s abatement cap-
ability is unaﬀected by the rivals’, the behaviour of aggregate green R&D as
N changes is Arrovian (resp., Schumpeterian) if the environment’s recycling
rate is suﬃciently low (resp., high). I.e., it is as if the industry were comple-
menting the natural absorption activities if the latter are not particurlarly
eﬀective (which corresponds to the Arrovian case), and conversely (which
instead correspond to the Schumpeterian case).
Looking at (22), and taking into account the special case outlined above,
one can hardly infer a well-deﬁned behaviour - let alone a monotone one -
of the aggregate R&D eﬀort in the regulated setting. More speciﬁcally, it
is plausible that variations in industry structure do generate any plausible
variations in (22), including non-monotone ones. Indeed, numerical simula-
tions can be performed to show the emergence of an inverted-U curve for
admissible constellations of parameter values. For instance, ﬁxing
a = 150; h = 1/10; z = 2/5; S¯ = 3× 104;
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Figure 1: Inverted-U-shaped aggregated investment curve
δ = 2/3; γ = 3/2; η = 2; ρ = 1/10, (24)
aggregate R&D steady state investment K∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

, N

, pSP


S¯

can
be drawn as in Figure 1, where the concavity of industry eﬀort emerges clearly
and K∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

, N

,SP


S¯

is maximised at N ≃ 822.
Something more can be said about the eﬀects of the size of the population
of ﬁrms. Concerning the supply side, we have
k∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

, N

,SP


S¯

= 0 at N ≃ 7348
x∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

, N

,SP


S¯

= 0 at N ≃ 7497
(25)
which implies that there exists a non-negligible range ofN, namely, (7349, 7389)
in which the individual R&D eﬀort drops to zero but ﬁrms still produce and
sell to consumers. As instead to the welfare performance of this industry, one
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can check that SW ∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

,N

,SP


S¯

is maximised at N ≃ 3522.
This result (at least in the numerical example based on the above values)
illustrates a situation in which consumer surplus matters more than the en-
vironmental externality, so that the industry structure that maximises wel-
fare is a lot more fragmented than that maximising the aggregate volume of
green R&D.
The inverted-U is relatively stable with respect to the model parameters.
However, the level and the position of the curve diﬀers. Table 1 summarizes
the dependence. The ﬁrst collumn includes the eﬀect on the peak, the second
collumn the eﬀect on the level of the curve and the third one links the whole
eﬀect to a one of the ﬁve graphs in ﬁgure 2, where the qualitative eﬀect on
the inverted-U shape is illustrated.
eﬀect on the peak eﬀect of curve level
ρ move to the right ambiguous: increase for low N , top left panel
decrease for high N
η move to the right ambiguous: decrease for low N , top right panel
increase for high N
γ no / marginal increase middle left panel
a no / marginal increase middle left panel
z move to the left decrease middle right panel
S¯ move to the right decrease low panel
δ move to the right decrease low panel
h move to the left decrease middle right panel
Table 1: Dependence of the inverted-U curve on the model parameters
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of the inverted-U curve (curve shifts along the arrow
for the corresponding increasing parameter)
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4.1 Discussion
Concerning the concavity of K∗


τSP


pSP


S¯

,N

,SP


S¯

with respect to
N, the foregoing analysis seems to imply that the arising of inverted-U curves
is the consequence of the pressure of regulatory policy (possibly, as is the
case in our model, of the adoption of multiple tools at the same time, to
pursue diﬀerent although - in some way - related objectives). This could
be a plausible explanation for the lack of analogous outcomes in the vast
literature discussing the bearings of industry structure on aggregate R&D,
that has been produced so far in IO.
The acquired wisdom on the matter, delivering monotone predictions in
one way or the other, can be quickly summarised as follows. The Schum-
peterian hypothesis claims that market power is the driver of innovation,
and therefore monopoly should be expected to stand out as the market form
producing the highest R&D incentives. This argument rests on the so-called
eﬃciency eﬀect, whereby a monopolist can at least replicate the behaviour
of any oligopolistic or perfectly competitive industry. Adhering to this view,
one should expect to observe aggregate R&D to decrease monotonically in
the number of ﬁrms. The opposite perspective is based on Arrow’s replace-
ment eﬀect, whereby a monopolist has a lower incentive to innovate than
a competitive industry (or any oligopoly in between) because, even if the
innovation is patentable, the monopolist’s beneﬁt reduces to replace itself by
acquiring the patent, while a smaller ﬁrm operating initially under much less
favourable conditions might gain monopoly power by getting to the patent
oﬃce before any of its rivals does.5 The large subsequent literature has al-
5A full account of this discussion is in Tirole (1988, ch. 10) and Reinganum (1989).
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ternatively conﬁrmed one view or the other, with the exception of Aghion et
al. (2005), where the only available model showing a non-monotone result
accompanies an empirical evidence with analogous properties. It is worth
stressing that most, if not all of this literature relies on theoretical models
where policy instruments are either absent ot taken as exogenously given.
How can we justify or interpret the arising of a concave aggregate R&D
eﬀort in the presented model? The source of this eﬀect must be found in some
aspect that the previous literature has overlooked, such that the outcome is
a non-monotone mixture of Arrow’s replacement eﬀect appearing ﬁrst, to be
replaced by Schumpeter’s eﬃciency eﬀect. The present model has several
special features. First of all, a patent system is left out of the picture.
Additionally (i) individual eﬀorts spill over to rivals; and (ii) innovation is
green, which amounts to saying that R&D is spurred by emission taxation.
That is, we are treating a particular type of investment which would be
altogether nil without an equally speciﬁc policy. Yet, Pigouvian taxation per
se is not an explanation of the arising of an inverted-U curve, as we know
from Corollary 4 and Lemma 5. In particular, the latter would imply a U-
shaped curve, not the opposite. Hence, the responsibility of our result must
be imputed to the remaining policy instrument, the regulated price pSP


S¯

.
From (11), we have that the aggregate eﬀort is
K∗ = N

zτ
ρ+ η
− γ

(26)
In (26) we can plug τ = τSP (p,N) from (16); however, τSP (p,N) being
linear and increasing in N, this yields a convex relationship between K∗ and
N. Therefore, the source of the inverted-U curve is not Pigouvian taxation.
What creates it is the additional policy measure regulating price, i.e., pSP


S¯
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from (20), using which we can rewrite (26) as follows:
K∗ = N

zτ (p (N) , N)
ρ+ η
− γ

(27)
Now observe that
∂K∗
∂N
=
z [τ +N (∂τ/∂n+ ∂τ/∂p · ∂p/∂n)]
ρ+ η
− γ (28)
and
∂2K∗
∂N2
=
z

2

∂τ
∂n
+
∂τ
∂p
∂p
∂n

+N

∂2τ
∂n2
+ 2
∂2τ
∂n∂p
∂p
∂n
+
∂2τ
∂p2

∂p
∂n
2
+
∂2p
∂n2
∂τ
∂p

ρ+ η
(29)
Setting (28) equal to zero, we obtain
∂τ
∂n
=
γ (η + ρ)− z (τ +N · ∂τ/∂p · ∂p/∂n)
Nz
(30)
This can be substituted into (29), which can also be further simpliﬁed us-
ing additional pieces of information that we can draw from expression (16),
whereby
∂2τ
∂n2
=
∂2τ
∂n∂p
=
∂2τ
∂p2
= 0. (31)
Hence, (29) simpliﬁes as follows:
∂2K∗
∂N2
=
2 [γ (η + ρ)− zτ ] + zN2 · ∂τ/∂p · ∂2p/∂n2
N (ρ+ η)
(32)
Observing (32), we may note that
γ (η + ρ)− zτ = − (η + ρ) k∗ < 0 (33)
and ∂τ/∂p ≷ 0 for all δ ≷ ρ - which again can be easily deduced from (16).
Accordingly, we may take a ﬁnal step and rewrite (32) in a more intuitive
form:
∂2K∗
∂N2
=
zN2 · ∂τ/∂p · ∂2p/∂n2 − 2 (η + ρ) k∗
N (ρ+ η)
(34)
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which is negative for all
k∗ > max

zN2 · ∂τ/∂p · ∂2p/∂n2
2 (η + ρ)
, 0

. (35)
If we conﬁne our attention to the parameter region deﬁned by δ > ρ, which
is what we have done to generate the inverted-U curve appearing in Figure
1 - then ∂τ/∂p > 0; therefore, in this range ∂2p/∂n2 < 0 suﬃces to ensure
that K∗ is indeed concave w.r.t. N for all k∗ > 0.
Having said that, two natural questions arises, namely, (i) should we
conclude that it is altogether impossible to reproduce the same result if reg-
ulation is assumed away in diﬀerential games investigating some form of
R&D for either process or product innovation? The few existing examples
(see Cellini and Lambertini, 2002, 2009, for instance)6 indeed yield mono-
tone outcomes, but are by no means general; (ii) shall we deem the usual
assumption of a linear market demand responsible for monotone outcomes?
In fact, empirical research (Hausman, 1981; Varian, 1982, 1990, inter alia)
has shown that most markets are characterised by non linear demand func-
tions, which are best approximated by isoelastic curves. These extensions
are left for future research.
5 Concluding remarks
We have characterised green R&D incentives for ﬁrms operating in an in-
dustry where production pollutes the environment the government regulates
6One could also address in the same spirit other dynamic models whose focus is on the
investment in advertising to expand the demand level or goodwill stock, as in Cellini and
Lambertini (2003a,b) and the references therein.
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the mark up and adopts a Pigouvian tax policy to decrease emissions and
stimulate the introduction of clean technologies. The model delivers a thus
far rare result, in the form of an inverted-U aggregate R&D expenditure at
equilibrium. The implication of our analysis seems to be that the empirical
evidence concerning the emergence of inverted-U curves is a consequence of
some form of regulation that modiﬁes the aggregate behaviour of the in-
dustry as compared to the predictions of theoretical models where regulation
is either totally exogenous or just assumed away. Whether ours is a special
(and fortunate) case or instead an indication of some general rule previously
overlooked, is a question left for future research.
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